State v. Patterson

Defendant appeals from a conviction and sentence for having intoxicating liquor in his possession for sale for beverage purposes. The sole bill of exception in the record was taken to the action of the judge in overruling a motion for a new trial. In this court, defendant has filed an assignment of errors, attacking the constitutionality of Act 39 of the Extra Session of 1921, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.

As only questions of fact were raised by the motion for a new trial, the ruling of the trial judge with respect thereto presents nothing for review.

Defendant’s first objection to the statute is, that it is in conflict with the National Prohibition Law (Act of Congress of October 28, 1919, 41 Stat. 305 [U. S. Comp. St. § 10138% et seq.]), and with the Eighteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. His second objection is that the body of the act embraces two distinct objects and purposes in violation of article 31 of the Constitution of 1898 and article 3, § 16, of the Constitution of 1921.

The reason for the first objection is that the state law imposes penalties of a lesser degree than those imposed by the federal statute.

*271 We are unable to perceive tbe force of this contention. . Section 2 of tbe Eighteenth Amendment confers on Congress and tbe several states concurrent power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. Tbe effect of tbe amendment was to give Congress tbe power to enact legislation to make prohibition effective within tbe territorial limits of tbe United States, while at the same time preserving the like power to tbe several states within their respective territories. Congress by tbe enactment of tbe National Prohibition Act, pursuant to tbe power conferred upon it by tbe amendment, has not deprived tbe states of tbe right to exercise their police power in tbe regulation and restriction of tbe liquor traffic, provided such regulation and restriction does not conflict with tbe provisions of such act. Tbe statute under which defendant was prosecuted is plainly not in conflict with tbe national prohibition laws. On tbe contrary, it tends to effectuate and not to defeat tbe purposes of tbe Eighteenth Amendment and tbe congressional enactment (Volstead Act). It is immaterial that .in tbe furtherance of its object tbe penalties under tbe state law are less severe than those provided by tbe federal statute. Ex parte Kinney, 53 Cal. App. 792, 200 P. 966; Youman v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 536, 237 S. W. 6; Ex parte Gilmore, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 529, 228 S. W. 199. See, also, Johnson v. State, 81 Fla. 783, 89 So. 114.

, In United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 S. Ct. 141, 67 L. Ed. 314, Chief Justice Taft, in discussing tbe reason for tbe adoption of tbe amendment and its effect on tbe respective legislative measures enacted by Congress and the several states to enforce prohibition, said, viz.:

“Each state, as also Congress, may exercise an independent judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition. Such as are adopted by Congress become laws of the United States, and such as are adopted by a state become laws of that state. They may vary in many particulars, including the penalties prescribed, but this is an inseparable incident of independent legislative action in distinct jurisdictions.”

Defendant’s second objection is equally unsound. It is founded on tbe assumption that tbe statute embraces two objects, namely,' to prohibit tbe manufacture, sale, transportation, etc., of intoxicating liquors, and to provide for tbe search of places suspected of containing intoxicating liquors. There is no conflict in tbe provisions of tbe statute. All of its clauses are reasonably and properly connected with, and related to, one another. Tbe purpose of tbe section authorizing tbe issuance of a search warrant is to facilitate tbe enforcement of tbe provisions of tbe law, and it is therefore clearly incidental and germane to tbe object of tbe act. In State v. Guidry, 142 La. 422, 76 So. 843, tbis court, citing many authorities, said:

“The constitutional requirement that a statute shall embrace only one object does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish the object of the law must be provided for by a separate act relating to it alone. A statute that deals with several branches of one subject does not thereby violate the constitutional requirement that the act must have only one object.”

For tbe reasons assigned, tbe conviction and sentence appealed from are affirmed.