Locke v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States | 1813-02-19
3 L. Ed. 364,7 Cranch 339,11 U.S. 339,1813 U.S. LEXIS 422
delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:
This is . a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, affirming a judg ment of the district Court, which condemned the cargo of the Wendell, as being forfeited to the United States.
The first point made by the Plaintiff in error, is that the information filed in the cause', is totally insufficient to sustain a judgment of condemnation.
The information consists of several counts, to all of which exceptions are taken- The Court however, is of opinion,-that the .4th count is good, and this renders it unnecessary to.decide on the others,
That count is founded on the 50th section of the collection law, and alleges every fact material to the of-fence.
It Is however objedted to this count, that the lime and place of importation, and the vessel in which it was made, are not alleged in the information, but are stated to bo unknown to the attorney.
*345 These circumstances are not essential to the offence, nor cab they, from the nature of the case, he presumed to be known to the prosecuting officer.
The offence is charged in such a manner as to come fully within the law, and is alleged to have been committed after the passage of the act, and before the exhibition of the information. This allegation, in such a case* is all that can be required.
The 4th count of the information being sufficient in law, the Court will proceed to examine, the testimony adduced to support it.
It is proved incontestibly that the goods are of foreign manufacture and consequently have been imponte ed into the United States.
The circumstances, on which thé suspicion is F -mded1- that they have been landed without a permit* are,
1st, That the whole cargo in fact, belongs to the claimant, and yet was shipped from Boston in the names of thirteen different persons, no one of whom had any interest in it, or was consulted respecting it* and several of whom have no real existence.
2d. That no evidence exists of a legal importation in-. to Boston, the port from which they were shipped, to Baltimore, where they were seized,
3d. That the original marks are removed, and others substituted in their place.
The counsel for the claimant has reviewed these circumstances separately, and has contendedthat .no one of them furnishes that solid ground of suspicion which can create a presumption of guilt and put his client on the proof of his innocence. That they are either indifferent in themselves — mere casualties — or are reasonably accounted for.
To the employment of fictitious names as shippers, he says, that if the circumstance be not totally immaterialp it is sufficiently accounted for by the deposition pf "Wih *346 liam French, who says, “ he understood that the clab mant in the cause, was in embarrassed circumstances some time before the shipment of these goods, and that he has understood and believes from general report that, fop the purpose of preventing his property from being attached, he was in the habit of shipping his property in the names of other persons.”
The Court is of opinion that the circumstance is far from being immaterial. It is certainly unusual for a merchant to cover liis transactions with a veil of mystery, and to trade under fictitious names. The mariner in which this mysterious conduct is accounted for, is not satisfactory. It does not appear that his creditors were in Baltimore,"or would be more disposed to attach his property in that plaice tjian in Boston, and it does not appear that in Boston the names of others were borrowed to protect his property from his creditors. The fact itstílf, if true, might be proved by pther and better testimony.' This habit might have, been proved by his-clerks.
An attempt is made to account for the circumstance that the goods were not regularly entered at the custom house of Boston, by the testimony of the same William French, who deposes that goods to a large amount are transported by land to Boston, and if intended for domestic consumption, are generally unaccompanied by certificates of having'paid the duties. The inference is therefore considered as a fair one, that these goods may liave paid the duties at some other port where they wercpurebased by Mr. Locke, and transported by land to Boston.
The Court is not satisfied with this inference. Goods .in packages, unaccompanied by certificates of having paid the duties, are always liable to bo questioned on that account. Large purchasers therefore, even where re-exportation is not intended, would choose to be furnished with this protection. It is a precaution which costs nothing, and which a prudent merchant will use. The presumption therefore, is always against the person who is in possession of goods in the original packages without these documents. This presumption ought to be removed, and may he removed, not by proving *347 that cases have existed where a purchaser of goods, that have been regularly entered, l\as omitted to furnish himself with certificates, but that the pai'ticular case i may reasonably bp supposed to be of that description. • The actual importation, or the actual purchase of the véry goods, or of goods of the same description, may be proved, and .ought to be proved by a person who, has been so negligent as not to obtain certificates that would exempt them from forfeiture.
The alteration of the original marks has been treated as an immaterial circumstance because no criminal motivé can be assigned for it. This alteration, it is Said, was not calculated to impress the revenue officers with the opinion that the duties had been paid, and is therefore not to be considered as made with that motive.
Certainly the alteration was not made without a motive. Men do not usually employ so much labor for nothing^ If they use mystery withoijt an object, they must expect to excite suspicion.
To do away that suspicion they ought to shew an object.
In .the present case, it is not improbable, that the motive was to relieve the goods from the suspicion of being .imported in violation of the then existing prohibitory laws. One witness, who deposes that the goods were of British manufacture, also deposes that he never saw goods imported from. Great Britain with such marks as those which were found on the goods of Mr. Locke. In the absence of other motives, the miml unavoidably suggests this.
If -these circumstances were even light, taken separately, they derive considerable weight from being united in the same case. If these goods have really paid a duty, it is peculiarly unfortunate that they should have been shipped without certificates of that fact, under fictitious names, from a port where they were not entered, and that the marks of the packages should have been changed. It is peculiarly unfortunate, that these circumstances Cannot be explained away by showing that the goods have been entered elsewhere, or even *348 that the claimant has purchased such goods from any person whatever.
combined circumstances furnish, in the opinion of the Court, just cause to suspect that the goods, wares, and merchandize against which the information in this case was filed, have incurred the penalties of the law.
But the counsel for the claimant contends that this is not enough to justify the Court in requiring exculpatory evidence from his client.- Guilt, he says must be proved before the presumption of innocence can be removed.
The Court does not so understand the act of Congress. The words of the 71st section of the collection law, which apply to thecase, are these: “And in ac- “ tions, suits, or informations to be brought, where any “seizure shall be made pursuant, to this act, if the pro- “ perty be claimed by any -person, in every such case “ theojms probandi shall beu pon such claimant.” “But the “ oniis probandi shall be on the claimant, oqly where pro- “ bable cause is shown for such prosecution, to be judged “ of by the Court before whom the prosecution is had.”
It is contended, that probable Gause means prima facie evidence, or, in other words, such evidence as, in the absence of exculpatory proof, would justify cohdemnation.
This argument has been very satisfactorily answered on the part of the United States by the observation, that this would render the provision totally inoperative. It may be added, that the term “ probable cause,” according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence, which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. In this, its legal sense, the Court must understand the term to have been used by Congress.
The Court is of opinion that there is no error# anil that the judgment be affirmed with costs.
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